

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-09

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EAE-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 EUR-12 /078 W

----- 058147

P R 111010Z SEP 75

FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 272

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LODON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 RANGOON 2595

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NK, SK, BM

SUBJECT: GUB POSITION ON KOREAN RESOLUTIONS

REF: STATE 213244 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY PER REFTTEL, WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH SOME OTHER FRIENDLY EMBASSIES HERE, ON THE KOREAN QUESTION INCLUDING UK, AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA, JAPAN, FRG AND ROK. UK MADE ITS VIEWS KNOWN TO MFA BUT RECEIVED ONLY EVASIVE RESPONSE. ROK MISSION SOMEWHAT DIVIDED: CHARGE EVIDENTLY DOES NOT BELIEVE A SHIFT IN THE BURMESE POSITION IS OCCURRING WHILE HIS DEPUTY SUSPECTS CHANGE IS IN THE WIND AND CITES EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT. AS TO REASONS FOR NEW GUB POSTURE, WE CAN AT THIS POINT ONLY SPECULATE THAT IT WOULD BE RELATED TO A REASSESSMENT OF THE REALITIES ON THE REGION IN THE WAKE OF INDOCHINA, AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE TIES WITH THE COMMUNIST STATES: AND PERHAPS AN ATTEMPT TO REDUCE PRC AND, POTENTIALLY, NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT FOR THE BCP INSURGENCY. WHATEVER THEIR MOTIVES, WE DOUBT THAT OUR DEMARCHES WILL HAVE MUCH IMPACT ON THE BURMESE. END SUMMARY.

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2. PER REFTTEL, WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH SOME OTHER FRIENDLY EMBASSIES HERE, ADVISING TTCM OF THE INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED OF A SHIFT IN THE GUB POSITION TOWARD DPRK, AND SUGGESTING THEY CONSIDER MAKING THEIR VIEWS ON THE KOREAN RESOLUTIONS KNOWN TO MFA.

3. THE UK AGREED TO PRESENT THE CASE FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION AND DID SO SEPTEMBER 9. MFA RESPONSE WAS AS EVASIVE AS IT WAS TO US (RANGOON 2536) WITH MINISTRY OFFICIAL CLAIMING THAT MFA HAD NOT YET RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE HOSTILE RESOLUTION FROM ITS MISSION AT THE UN (MFA HAD USED THE SAME PLOY EARLIER WHEN THE JAPANESE MADE THEIR DEMARCHE; JAPANESE PROMPTLY HANDED THEM A COPY OF THE RESOLUTION.)

4. AS TO OTHER MISSION HERE, THE AUSTRALIANS HAVE AGREED TO TAKE THE ISSUE UP WITH THE GUB BUT ARE AWAITING APPOINTMENT WITH MFA. THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM BONN; HOWEVER, HE STILL REMAINED SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL TYMT A SHIFT IN GUB POLICY HAS OCCURRED. THE INDONESIANS WERE RATHER UN-RESPONSIVE, STATING THAT THEY HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ISSUE AND DID NOT VOLUNTEER TO SEEK THEM. THE JAPANESE, OF COURSE, HAVE ALREADY MADE THEIR DEMARCHE AND EVIDENCED NO INTEREST IN REPEATING IT. WE DECIDED NOT TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS AS SUGGESTED REFTTEL SINCE THEY HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE HERE AND PROBABLY WANT TO RESERVE THEIR LIMITED DIPLOMATIC AMMUNITION TO ENSURE CONTINUED BURMESE ABSTENTION ON ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTIONS. FOR THE MOMENT, WE ARE HOLDING OFF APPROACHES TO FILIPINOS (THEIR AMBASSADOR IS AWAY) AND MALAYSIANS.

5. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST HAS BEEN THE ROK REACTION. WE CONSULTED AGAIN WITH ROK CHARGE' LEE WHO REMAINS RATHER UNCONCERNED SINCE HE EVIDENTLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SHIFT, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN THE ROK SPECIAL ENVOY LAST MONTH THAT BURMA WOULD, IN WORST CASE, ABSTAIN ON KOREAN QUESTION. HOWEVER, HIS DEPUTY, MR. KIN, A VETERAN OF FIVE YEARS IN BURMA, CALLED ON EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 10 TO EXPRESS HIS OWN BELIEF THAT A CHANGE IS IN THE WIND, THE ASSURANCES TO THEIR ENVOY NOTWITHSTANDING. KIN CITES AS INDICATIONS U HLA PHONE'S SPEECH AT LIMA (RANGOON 2585) WITH ITS HEAVY STRESS ON THE REMOVAL OF GREAT FOREIGN POWERS FROM THE  
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REGION. HE ALSO ASSERTS THAT HLA PHONE HELD LARGE BANQUET FOR WHOLE DPRCSTAFF HERE SEPTEMBER 10 IN THANKS FOR HIS RECEPTION IN PYONGPYANG WHILE FONMIN CUSTOMARILY GIVES SOMENHORT OF FUNCTION FOR HOF MISSION ON RETURN FROM AN OFFICIAL VISIT, IT IS USUALLY A SMALL INFORMAL DINNER. KIM ALSO NOTES THAT HIS EMBASSY PRESENTED REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT FOR NEW ROK ENVOYI MONTH AGO AND HAS YET TO RECEIVE RESPONSE. FINALLY, KIN HAS A REPORT (WE ARE UNABLE TO CONFIRM) THAT HLA PHONE CARRIED TO PYONGPYANG A REQUEST FROM NE

WIN FOR KIL IL SUNG'S ASSISTANCE IN PERSUADING THE PRC TO REDUCE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE BCP AND INDICATING THAT CLOSER DPRK-GUBB RELATIONS MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING. KIM NOTED THAT DPRK SPECIAL ENVOY INVITED NE WIN TO VISIT NORTH KOREA (RETURN INVITATION EXTENDED KIM IL SUNG BY HLA PHONE) AND SPECULATED THAT NE WIN MIGHT MAKE A SIDE TRIP TO PYONG YANG AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT TO PEKING THIS FALL, WHICH IS BECOMING WELL KNOWN IN DIPCORPS.

6. ASSUMING THAT GUB IS TILTING TOWARD DPRK, THE QUESTION REMAINS WHY. THERE ARE VARIOUS PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS THAT COME TO MIND. WE KNOW, FOR INSTANCE, THE RESEARCH DIVISION OF MFA HAS PREPARED AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE REGION IN

THE WAKE OF THE FALL OF INDOCHINA. SUCH A REASSESSMENT MAY WELL HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE NEW STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS IN THE AREA CALLED FOR A BETTERING OF RELATIONS WITH THE WINNERS;

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 RANGOON 2595

CERTAINLY HRLA PHONE'S VISIT TO THE PRC AND NE WIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT WOULD APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT BURMA IS ENGAGED IN SOMENAO RT OF MOVE TO IMPROVE ITS TIES. IN THIS FRAMEWORK, A SHIFT ON THE DPRK QUESTION WOULD GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT BURMA ACKNOWLEDGES THEIR STATUS IN ASIA. SUCH A MOVE MIGHT ALSO

BE USED TO PLEASE SOME ELEMENTS WITHIN BURMA, INCLUDING, AS ONE STORY HAS IT, SOME POLITICAL "OUTS" WHOSE SUPPORT NE WIN MAY BE SEEKING, AND WHO HAVE SUGGESTED MORE POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY THE PRC.

7. ANOTHER ASPECT PROBABLY CONSIDERED BY THE BURMESE IS, AS KIN NOTED, THE QUESTION OF THE BCP INSURGENCY. AN OVERTURE TO CHINA SUCH AS A SHIFT ON THE KOREAN QUESTION WOULD BE DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN DIPLOMATIC TIES IN AN EFFORT TO WEAKEN PRC "PARTY" SUPPORT FOR THE BCP. CERTAINLY, A WARM RECEPTION FOR NE WIN IN PEKING WOULD BE SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTING TO THE BCP LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELD. ALSO, AS HAS OFTEN BEEN RUMORED, THE BURMA ARMY MAY BE CONSIDERING A PUSH INTO BCP TERRITORY AND ARE ATTEMPTING TO ENSURE THAT THE PRC WILL NOT INTERVENE IF THE BCP IS DRIVEN BACK TO THE BORDER. ALONG THE SAME LINES, THE GUB MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERING ITS POSITION VIS A VIS NORTH VIETNAM, NOW A MAJOR SECRET

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MILITARY POWER, WHICH COULD SUPPORT THE BCP EFFORT THROUGH LAOS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A PRO-DPRK VOTE PRESUMABLY WOULD NOT BE LOST ON HANOI.

8. WHATEVER THE REASON FOR THE CHANGE IN BURMA'S "NEUTRALIST" STANCE (AND WE ARE NOT AS YET ABLE TO ANALYZE FROM A VERY EXTENSIVE BASIS OF FACT), IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT OUR DEMARCHES ON THE SUBJECT WILL HAVE MUCH IMPACT. THE BURMESE PROBABLY "COSTED OUT" THE ISSUE AND DECIDED THAT THE GAINS ACCRUED WITH THEIR COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS EXCEEDED WHATEVER LOSSES IN THE WEST THE MOVE MIGHT ENTAIL. IN THE CASE OF THE US, FOR INSTANCE, THEY COULD WELL HAVE CALCULATED THAT THE ONLY REAL LEVERAGE WE HAVE AT THE MOMENT IS THE DELIVERY OF THE HELICOPTERS - AND THAT THIS IS AS MUSH IN OUR INTEREST (NARCOTICS CONTROL) AS IT IS IN THEIRS.

9. WE WILL BE INTERESTED IN DEPARTMENT'S READING FOLLOWING MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR TIN LATT. HOWARTH

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